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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. KEITH HOWICK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsBANK OF SALT LAKE,
Defendant & Third
Party PlaintiffAppellant,
-vsRICHARD A. ROBERTS and
ROBERTS MERCHANDISE
MART, a corporation,
Third Party DefendantRespondent.

Case No.
12742

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
E. Keith Howick
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was filed to require the Bank of Salt
Lake, Appellant, to honor a certain savings Certificate
of Deposit which said Bank refused to honor upon presentation by E. Keith Howick, Respondent, and which
had been assigned to the Respondent by Robert Merchandise Mart (Third Party Defendant and Respondent) for payment of attorney's fees.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On November 30, 1971 the Third District Court
of Salt Lake Countv,
. the Honorable Stewart 1\1. Han·
sen presiding, rendered summary judgment in favor
of Respondent, said order being duly signed on December 1, 1971.
,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the decision of the District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts omits several important details, therefore, Respondent feels that an additional Statement of Facts is necessary to clarify and
supplement some of the statements made in Appellant's
Brief. The term Respondent used herein refers solely
to Plaintiff-Respondent, E. Keith Howick.
During the early part of 1968, Respondent was ap·
proached by Third Party Defendants-Respondents to
perform various legal services in connection with for·
mation of a corporation and all necessary legal work
pertaining to the filing and receiving of a public offer·
ing in the State of Utah. ( R. 13) Thereafter, a Re·
ta:ner Agreement was signed by promoters on March
20, 1968 retaining Respondent to perform these serv·
ices. All necessary legal work pertaining to said re·
tainer was performed including many additional amend·
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ments and resubmissions because of changes requested
by the promoters.
Thereafter, an additional Agreement was signed
by the promoters on the 21st day of August, 1968 which
fairly represented the attorney's fees due Respondent
and which included as security for the payment of said
fees the Certificate of Deposit which is the subject of
this suit. (R. 14)
The said Agreement of August 21, 1968 and Certificate of Deposit were taken by Respondent based
upon representation made by Third Party DefendantRespondent that no incumbrances of any kind were attached or commited to said Certificate. Third Party
Defendant-Respondent submitted to Respondent herein copies of their Balance Sheet and Accountant's letter,
both having date of August 20, 1968, wherein no lia·bilities nor indebtedness of any kind were listed pertaining
to Roberts Merchandise Mart and no incumbrances to
any item under "Cash On Hand And In Bank" were
listed. ( R. 40)
It was an integral part of the latter Agreement that
should the attorney's fees not be paid within two weeks
prior to the redemption date of the said Certificate that
said Certificate would be assigned to Respondent as
payment for said fees. That on November 18, 1968,
Mr. Richard A. Roberts did formally assign said Certificate to Respondent. Respondent presented said Certifirate to Appellant at approximately 9:30 A.M. on
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November 19, 1968 for redemption whereupon said Appellant refused to honor same. (R. 14, 15)
That when Respondent presented the Certificatt
of Deposit for redemption he was informed that Appellant claimed a security interest in said document.
That this was the first time Respondent had any notice
of any security claim against the said Certificate. (R.
15) Further, it is noted that the Certificate of Deposit
has no marks of any kind upon either the face or the
reverse side of said document indicating a claimed se·
curity interest in said document by Appellants. (R. 14)
The Appellant had not perfected its claim as re·
quired under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code up
to the time of presentation and did not file the necessary
documents until approximately 11 :23 A.M. on N ovem·
ber 19, 1968, approximately two hours after Respondent
had presented the Certificate for redemption. (R. 15)
It is the contention of the Respondent that the record
adequately shows sufficient evidence to justify affirming of the Lower Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS TO
PRESERVE ITS CLAIMED LIEN.
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It is evident from a careful reading of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code that the Certificate of Deposit, which is the subject matter of this case, is regulated and governed by two principal chapters. At first
glance, one might assume that the only chapter pertinent
in the case is Chapter 3--COMMERCIAL PAPER
(70A-3) . This topic and area will be discussed in
POINT II. However, it is also evident that Chapter 8
INVESTMENT SECURITIES (70A-8) also applies in this situation.

"SECURITY" by definition of 70A-8-102 is an
instrument which:
( i)

is issued in bearer or registered form;
and

(ii)

is of a type commonly dealt in upon
securities exchanges or markets or
commonly recognized in the area in
which it is issued or dealt in as a medium of investment; and

(iii)

is either one of a class or series or by
its terms is divisible into a class or
series of instruments; and

(iv)

evidences a share, part or portion or
other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of
the issuer. Id
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It is evident that a Certificate of Deposit fits these
several catagories. First, it is made in "registered form"
i.e. it specifically specifies the entity entitled to the
security and it is specifically numbered and recorded
by said number on the records of the issuer for the purpose of transfer and or redemeption. It meets criteria
(ii) in that it is both commonly recognized in the area
in which it is issued and Certificates of Deposit are dealt
in as a median for investment. It also meets (iii) in that
it is one of a class or seres as issued by the issuer and
finally (iv) is met in that it evidences an obligation of
the issuer to pay a sum certain.

In addition, Section 70A-8102 (b) notes that:
"A writing which is a security is governed by this
Chapter and not by Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper even though it also meets the require·
ments of that Chapter. This Chapter does not apply to
money." Id.
By inserting this Section the Legislature made it
clear that many items could be classified as a security
but that specifically "money" could not be.
The above statutory argument having been pre·
sented to the Trial Court at the time of the Motion
Respondent further submits the following case law in
support of said argument.
In Superintendent of Insurance of State of New
York -vs- Bankers Life and Casualty Co., D.C.N.Y.,
300 F. Su pp 1083, ll 00 ( 1963) , this matter was dealt
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with as dicta and the Court noted that "Certificates of
Deposit issued for cash by banks could be considered
equivalent of an 'evidence of indebtedness' and would be
'securities' within the meaning of the Securities Act."
Id.
Further investigation leads us to the general rule
that Certificates of Deposit are generally dealt with
as a promissory note when they are "payable on return
thereof properly endorsed" and are "in legal effect a
promissory note payable on demand, and principles applicable to such notes should be applicable to Certificates of Deposit." (Union Guardian Trust Co., -vsEmery, 290 N.W. 841, 845 ( 1940)). It is further generally accepted that promissory notes are treated as
securities (Wagner -vs- Scherer, 85 NYS 894, 895,
89 App. Div. 202 {1903) ).
It has also been held in estate law that the "term
'securities' when used in a will can mean any and all
evidences of debt, such as a promissory note." (Huckakee -vs- Hansen, 422 S."\V.2d 606 ( 1967) ) . A check
was even held as a security in Hawkins -vs- Sanford,
D.C. Ga., 53F, Supp 988, 989 {1944).

Thus the Certificate of Deposit issued in this case
can be classified as a security and thus falls under Uniform Commercial Code 70A Chapter 8.
Appellant in this matter claims a prior lien on this
security. To determine whether this claim is valid we
must see if the Appellant meets the criteria of 70A-8-

R
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issuers lien.

legislated for the requirements of a valid

"A lien upon a security in favor of an issuer
thereof is valid against a purchaser only if the
right of the issuer to such lien is noted conspicuously (emphasis added) on the security."
Id.
It is evident from even a glance at the Certificate
of Deposit in question that there is no indication of any
kind whatsoever on the security; therefore, no claim
could or should be allowed.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MO·
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT
THERE IS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT
REMAINING TO BE DESCRIBED AT
TRIAL.
Appellant either refusing or neglecting to deal with
the law discussed under Point I relies in his argument
solely on the defense that a material issue of fact is in
existance which should go to the jury and therefore
summary judgment should not be allowed.
To support this, Appellant uses Thompson -vs·
Ford .Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P. 2d 62 (1964);
however, that case is easily distinguished from this. The

.
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Thompson case was one dealing with two very difficult
questions ( 1) negligence and ( 2) proximate cause. Considering the justification of judgment by summary
judgment in these matters the Court said, "The issue
of proximate cause presents an even more difficult
absolute to the granting of summary judgment." (Id.
p. 34)
Further Appellant relies on Singleton -vs- Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 293, 431, p. 2d 125 ( 1967) wherein
the Court specifically distinguished the differences between that case and the one before it now. Again the
Court was deciding the difficult issues of ( 1) negligence and ( 2) standard of care. The Court again
stated, as it did in Thompson, that these cases were not
easily decided by summary judgment but then went on
to say "summary judgments are more frequently given
in contract cases because of greater ease in determining
the factual issues. In tort claims defendants frequently
rely on affirmative defenses of ... and such defenses
are just as easy to establish as are matters of contract."
Id p. 294.
Thus the Court itself distinguishes these cases from
the one at bar by determining that issues such as negligence, proximate cause and standard of care are difficult and not easily susceptible to summary judgment
but that tort and contract issues are much easier to decide the issues of fact.
Respondent contends that this ease obviously is not
one of negligence, proximate cause or standard of care
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but that it aligns itself with contract issues and therefore, summary judgment is an appropriate remedy.
Respondent submits that from the documents of
record in this case that there is ample evidence submit·
ted by Respondent to overcome all claims of Appellant
and that from Appellant's evidence submitted that
there is no possible evidence made by Appellant which
if presented at trial could materially affect the outcome
of this case.

It is this issue that the Court has squarely dealt
with before. In the case of Dupler -vs- Yates, 10 Ut
2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624 ( 1960) , the Court determined the
merits of summary judgment when it said the "primary
purpose of summary judgment procedure is to pierce allegations of pleadings and show that there is no gen·
uine issue of material fact, although an issue may be
raised by the pleadings, (emphasis added) Id p. 269.
The requirements of proof to show the non-exist·
ence of a material fact was said to be "less than that required to prove a matter of affirmative defense." Id
p. 268.
Respondent has continuously herein submitted
documentation sufficient to show that no issue of fact
exists and Appellant has continuously relied on nothing
more than oral averments that one does. As a matter
of public record, the public offering for Roberts Mer·
chandise Mart indicates that no liabilities exist against
any asset listed and this is so noted and prepared by the
accountants who stated such and Respondent asks the

1
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Court to take judicial notice of said public document
on file with the Utah Securities Commission.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEREIN
BECAUSE APPELLANT AT ALL TIMES
FAILED TO COMPLY 'VITH FILING REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO PRESERVE
IT'S CLAIMED LIEN.
Appellant had within its availability to protect itself against any claims to the said Certificate of De.:.
posit. It was the issuer of said Certificate and as such
could have kept it in its possession. It did not do so but
deliberately let it go into the market place unmarked.
Further, Appellant could have been fully and
amply protected by merely filing with the Secretary
of State for the State of Utah pursuant to the Uniform
Commercial Code 70A-9-401 (b) again, they failed to
do so. Such negligence on the part of Appellant's cannot now be overcome by mere oral averments of notice.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing arguments, authorities and documents of record, it is submitted by Re-
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spondent, E. Keith Howick, that the Trial Court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HO,VICK & RUDD
1625 Foothill Drive

Salt Lake City, Utah
E. Keith Howick
Attorney for Respondent

